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THE GOLDEN AGE OF AGING, AND
ITS DISCONTENTS
Peter H. Schuck
Today's senior citizens in the United States live in the "golden age of aging,"
receiving more benefits from the government than ever before, far beyond what they
reasonably could have expected to receive a generation ago. A large portion of
government spending goes to seniors, especially to cover medical care, and Professor
Schuck argues that much of this spending is inefficient and, at times, ineffective. In
light of the 2008-2009 economic climate and President Obama's push for health care
reform, Professor Schuck argues that now is the time to make the hard choices that
would lead to more efficient medical care for seniors, even though that may mean
rationing of care, an intensely controversial proposition. He argues that the decision
on whether to go forward with a medical procedure should be based on the number of
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) derived from the procedure, which is often
heavily tied to age.
I am particularly gratified to be addressing an
aspect of elder law, as it provides me with an opportunity to return to
an old scholarly interest. My very first article as a law professor,
entitled The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination
Professor Schuck is the Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale Law
School. He would like to express his gratitude to the Baum family for generously en-
dowing the series of Anna F. Baum Memorial Lectures in Elder Law. He would also
like to thank Professor Richard Kaplan, the Pedersen Professor of Law at the Universi-
ty of Illinois College of Law, and Dean Bruce Smith for inviting him to give this lec-
ture. This essay benefitted from comments on earlier versions from Professors David
Super, David Hyman, and Richard Kaplan, as well as participants in the Yale Law
School Faculty Workshop.
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Act of 1975, was published in my vanity press, The Yale Law Journal.'
In the article, I maintained that age is a characteristic whose
vulnerability to invidious discrimination is quite unlike-and much
less unjust than-that of race, religion, national origin, and other
suspect classifications of the kinds of minorities that Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to protect. Arguing that
modeling the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (ADA) on Title VI, as
Congress had done, was a category mistake, I predicted that its
analytical incoherence would produce much litigation. That
prediction, like my stock market bets, turned out to be quite wrong.
In fact, the ADA has seldom been cited or litigated.2 So much for my
maiden academic voyage on the perilous seas of prognostication.
For substantive significance (as distinct from theoretical interest),
I would have done far better to scrutinize the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 3 which has been a mother lode for
litigators. Indeed, the Supreme Court in June handed down only the
most recent of its many decisions interpreting the ADEA.4 Yet much
the same conceptual and analytical critique I made of the ADA applies
as well to the ADEA. I shall return to this question of age discrimina-
tion, but it is peripheral to my lecture here.
Instead, my focus is on the policy implications of the impending
fiscal crisis in Medicare, which is driven in large part by the aging of
America. This aging takes three forms that can usefully be distin-
guished. The first is chronological aging: the population as a whole is
getting older. The second is physical aging due to disability, illness,
and more routine wear-and-tear. While generally correlated with
chronological aging, it follows a different path due to improved living
standards, health care, and so forth. The third is what David Thom-
son calls political aging: "the shift from youth to elder priorities which
has dominated all welfare states in the last few decades."" Although
1. Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act
of 1975,89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979).
2. JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF Er AL., ELDERLAW: ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 3.11
(2d ed. 1993). As of August 2008, only eighteen cases had been reported under the
Act since July 1979. Id.
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
4. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (increasing the burden
on ADEA plaintiffs). Key Democratic lawmakers are seeking to overturn the deci-
sion. Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Working to Overturn Justices on Age Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, at A20.
5. DAVID THOMSON, SELFISH GENERATIONS? How WELFARE STATES GROW
OLD 4 (rev. ed. 1996).
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the eligibility structure of certain social programs uses chronological
aging, it is physical aging that occasions the massive costs that burden
some of these programs, particularly Medicare and Medicaid, and it is
political aging that requires that we reconsider what our priorities in
such programs should be in the future.
Although I shall refer mainly to Medicare, most of the analysis
applies with at least as much force to Medicaid, which pays the vast
majority of long-term care costs for the elderly (as well as for some of
their other health-related costs), 6 and whose fiscal condition is in some
ways even more parlous than that of Medicare.7 I do not focus on So-
cial Security, which is also approaching insolvency, because the Medi-
care/Medicaid crisis is far more severe and immediate and involves
much more money.8 In addition, the policy reforms needed to make
Social Security actuarially and fiscally sustainable, while certainly
daunting as a political matter,9 are more straightforward than for
Medicare and Medicaid.10 At this writing, the health care reforms re-
cently passed by Congress and signed by President Obama seer like-
ly, despite energetic assurances to the contrary, to increase Medicare
costs, not reduce them."
6. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/home/medicaid.asp (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2010).
7. See generally MARTHA N. OZAWA & YEONG HUN YEO, PROBLEMS IN
MEDICAID FUNDING (2007).
8. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE
PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORTS, http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TRSUM/index.html ("Medicare's financial difficulties come sooner-and
are much more severe-than those confronting Social Security."). The projected
Medicare Trust Fund deficit over the next seventy-five years is now estimated at
almost $38 trillion. See OZAWA & YEO, supra note 7, at 9.
9. Social Security, famously, "is the third rail of American politics. Touch it,
you're dead." For the provenance of this metaphor, see William Safire, Third Rail,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/
magazine/ 18wwlnsafire.t.html.
10. For analyses of many of the options, see VIRGINIA P. RENO & JONI LAVERY,
NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY: ADEQUATE BENEFITS,
ADEQUATE FINANCING (2009), http://www.nasi.org/publications2763/
publications.show.htm?doc id=1067669 and Craig Copeland, Social Security
Reform: How Different Options Might Affect Future Funding, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
NOTES, Sept. 2009.
11. Dennis Smith, Note to Congress: Expanding Healthcare Entitlements Is Bad
Policy, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 12, 2009, at 5. Experience suggests
that massive savings from eliminating "fraud and abuse" will prove illusory.
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I shall use the Medicare crisis to explore a number of topics that
we must carefully analyze if we are to figure out how to contain it.1
2
These topics are (1) "the golden age of aging"; (2) the rapidly ap-
proaching twilight of this golden age; (3) the political economy of ag-
ing; (4) the need for better targeting in social programs; (5) the hard
choices that are upon us; (6) the moral demands of intergenerational
relationships; and (7) some policy approaches that flow from my
analysis. Along the way, I shall defend some of the hard choices that I
favor-a privilege I claim as a senior citizen who would have to bear
my share of the constraints that these policy choices would impose on
us elderly.
I. The Golden Age of Aging
Today is truly the golden age of aging. Lest we take this for
granted, as we do so much of our good fortune, let me illustrate with
demographic statistics how much better we seniors live than ever be-
fore in our history. (I would say "ever before in human history," ex-
cept that seniors in some other industrialized countries like Japan live
longer, enjoy more respect, and in some ways live better than their
American counterparts do.) This dramatic increase in well-being is
evident in statistics on life expectancy, quality of life, independent liv-
ing, family ties, education levels, income and wealth, and safety net
benefits.
A. Life Expectancy
The average life span of an American born only a century or so
ago was forty-seven years; today it is seventy-eight (and about eighty-
three for women).'3 In the United States, as elsewhere, this gain is
mainly due to public health measures and a higher standard of living,
although improved health care that dramatically reduced infant and
12. This is hardly an unexplored subject. For very recent book-length discus-
sions, see, for example, ROBERT N. BUTLER, THE LONGEVITY REVOLUTION (2008)
and JAMEs H. SCHULz & ROBERT H. BINSTOCK, AGING NATION: THE ECONOMICS
AND POLTICS OF GROWING OLDER IN AMERICA (2006).
13. MELONIE HERON Er AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL VITAL
STATISTICS REPORTS 26 tbl.7 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr57/nvsr57J14.pdf. For the world as a whole, it was about thirty years; today it
is sixty-seven. A Slow-Burning Fuse, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009, at 3.
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maternal mortality played its part.' 4 Comparatively speaking, howev-
er, the United States has little to boast about; life expectancy is eighty-
three in Japan and exceeds eighty-one in Israel, Austria, Spain, and
some other countries.,5
Our vastly longer life span has transformed the very concept of
being elderly. We commonly remark on how much younger we look
and feel than our parents did at our ages-if they were fortunate
enough to have survived this long. Another aspect of this transforma-
tion of what it means to be elderly, one more relevant to Social Securi-
ty than to Medicare, is the number of years spent in retirement after
working ceases. Today, it is almost twenty years in the United States
(again, higher for women), a bit below the OECD average,16 reflecting
a pattern of earlier retirement coupled with longer life span.
B. Quality of Life
Although the quality of life for the elderly is difficult to define,
one important index of it is surely their ability to engage in the activi-
ties of everyday life during those years. Recent research finds that
disability for seniors in the United States has declined significantly in
recent years, as it has in some other (but not all) OECD countries.' 7 In
this important sense, physical age has not advanced nearly as steadily
and remorselessly as chronological age. Seniors also have much less
to fear about their personal security because of steadily declining rates
of violent crime, of which they were especially vulnerable victims in
the past.18
14. RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER ET AL., HEALTH INTERVENTION AND POPULATION
HETEROGENEITY 25-29 (1985).
15. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIETY AT A GLANCE, OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS 117 tbl.HE8.4 (2009),
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_34637_2671576_1_1_1_100.h
tmi.
16. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
STATISTICAL PORTAL, http:/ /www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,3398,en_- 2825_
49455311111,00.htnl (follow "OECD Population Pyramids in 2000 and
2050").
17. Kenneth G. Manton et al., Long-Term Trends in Life Expectancy and Active
Life Expectancy in the United States, 32 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 81, 83 (2006).
18. In 1973, 9.1 individuals per 1,000 individuals aged over 65 were the vic-
tims of a violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and assault).
By 2005, only 2.4 individuals per 1,000 individuals over the age of 65 were the vic-
tims of violent crime. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE
U.S., http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/tables/elder (last visited Feb.
8, 2010).
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C. Independent Living
Another measure of the quality of life, at least in American cul-
ture, is independence. In the United States, in 2008, 80.1% of people
aged sixty-five and over owned their house, most of them free and
clear of mortgage. 9
D. Family Ties
If this independence were achieved at the cost of close family
ties, it might not be an unequivocally good thing, but this does not
appear to be the case for today's seniors. Sixty-six percent of them
live within thirty minutes of a family member.1 In addition, of course,




Another aspect of quality of life is education, which enhances
one's ability to enjoy the cultural riches that an increasingly integrated
world offers, an ability that has been vastly extended by cable TV and
the Internet. Every generation of seniors has been better educated
than the last. A generation ago, 24% of the elderly were high school
19. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES AND HOME OWNERSHIP
tbl.957, http:/ /www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s957.pdf. In
2007, roughly 68% of homeowners aged sixty-five and older owned their homes
free and clear. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., A Profile of Older Ameri-
cans: 2009, http://www.aoa.gov/AoARoot/Aging-Statistics/Profile/2009/11.
aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). Their ability to raise the cash necessary to live
independently may also be growing as they sell their "life settlement" insurance
policies to businesses that can then securitize the policies. See, e.g., Jenny Ander-
son, Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009,
at Al. This practice may be restricted in the future. E-mail from John H. Lang-
bein, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., to author (Oct. 4, 2009) (on file with
author).
20. GEORGE P. MOSCHIS, MARKETING TO OLDER CONSUMERS: A HANDBOOK OF
INFORMATION FOR STRATEGY DEvELOPMENT 63 (1992).
21. As of 2007, 78% of men and 57% of women aged sixty-five to seventy-four
were married. FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING-RELATED STATISTICS, OLDER
AMERICANS 2008: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 5 (2008), http://www.
agingstats.gov/agingstatsdotnet/MainSite/Data/2008_Documents/OA_2008.
pdf thereinafter FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM]. At older ages, the percentages of
married individuals obviously decreases. Id. In 2007, 38% of women aged seven-
ty-five to eighty-four and 15% of women eighty-five and over were married; 74%
of men seventy-five to eighty-four and 60% of men aged eighty-five and older
were married. Id.
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graduates, and only 5% held a bachelor's degree. In 2007, 76% of
them had graduated from high school, and 19% held at least a bache-
lor's degree.2 3 Additionally, the gender gap in educational attainment
continues to narrow.24
F. Income and Wealth
Over the past forty years, American males aged fifty-five and
over have become substantially more likely to retire. In 1963, 90% of
men aged fifty-five to sixty-one were active in the workforce. 5 By
2006, only 75% of men in that age group were in the workforce-a
huge decline. 26 In 1963, 76% of men aged sixty-two to sixty-four were
employed; as of 2006, the comparable figure was only 52%.27 Female
employment trends go in the other direction. Because of relatively
low female paid employment in the 1960s, women over fifty-five are
now more likely to be working than before.2
Significantly, the long-range trend toward earlier retirement for
seniors has reversed in the last twenty-five years. In March 2009,
33% of men and 25% of women aged sixty-five to sixty-nine were em-
ployed, and although the proportion of older Americans who work
declines sharply after age sixty-five, 14% of men and 8% of women
who were seventy or older were still working.30 People aged fifty-five
and older accounted for two-thirds of the net jobs created during the
employment expansion between late 2001 and late 2007. Perhaps
most remarkable, they have actually gained nearly one million jobs
during this recession at a time when labor participation has fallen for
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 88.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Why Are Americans Delaying Retirement Date?, Employee Benefit
Research Institute, Fast Facts #138, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.
ebri.org/pdf/FFE138.01OctO9.Finl.pdf. For an analysis of this change, see JOHN H.
LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 847-49 (4th ed. 2006). At
the same time, the share of people taking early Social Security benefits rose sharply
in fiscal year 2009, which may reflect recession-related employment obstacles. Ri-
chard Wolf, Social Security Collectors Up 19%, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2009, at Al. It is
unclear how these developments square with those discussed in supra text accom-
panying notes 23-25.
30. PATRICK PURCELL, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., INCOME AND POVERTY
AMONG OLDER AMERICANS IN 2008, at 22 (2009).
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every other age group.31 Indeed, during the 2000-2008 period when
the teenage employment rate dropped by 34%, the rate for those aged
fifty-five to sixty-four rose by 7%, and the rate for seniors increased by
29%.32
Internationally, America's seniors may be unique in this respect:
in 2008, almost a third of those aged sixty-five to sixty-nine were still
in the labor force, compared with only 4% in France either working or
looking for work.33 All of this suggests that current and soon-to-be se-
niors, far from being shunted aside by employers in favor of younger
workers, are actually favored by them, which in turn implies that age
discrimination may now be working in reverse!
In sharp contrast with earlier generations, the incomes of today's
seniors exceed those of the average American. Fifty years ago, 35% of
older Americans lived in poverty; in 2008, less than 10% of them did.3
In 1974, only 18% of older Americans were categorized as high-
income; in 2006, nearly 29% of them werei Their Social Security ben-
efits are not only larger, but they are indexed to inflation, an advan-
tage granted by few, if any, private pensions3 and only a handful of
37public programs. In fact, leading economists believe that these in-
dexed benefits actually overcompensate recipients for inflation.M
Most seniors' Medicare Part B benefits for physician services are also
protected against inflation because their premiums cannot be in-
creased for any year (such as 2009) in which their Social Security bene-
fits do not rise.39 And although seniors spend more than younger
31. Employment Data Are Showing Shades of Gray, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, at
C14.
32. Left Behind, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 2009, at 26-27.
33. Catherine Rampell & Matthew Saltmarsh, A Reluctance to Retire Means
Fewer Openings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,2009, at Al.
34. PURCELL, supra note 30, at 24.
35. FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM, supra note 21, at 12.
36. Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Social Security, 3 ELDER L.J. 191, 207
(1995).
37. E-mails from David A. Super, Professor of Law, Univ. of Md. Law Sch., to
author (Aug. 13,2009) (on file with author). Indeed, Social Security's indexing me-
thod has given each senior a bonus-over-inflation of $516 this year, while a special
"hold harmless" provision in the Medicare Part B program has given those seniors
an additional $96, for a total of $612. See The Diet COLA Myth, WALL ST. J., Aug.
28, 2009, at A14.
38. See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin, Causes and Consequences of Bias in the Consumer
Price Index as a Measure of the Cost of Living, 33 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 1, 3 (2005).
39. Robert Pear, Social Security Benefits Not Expected to Rise in '10, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2009, at A23.
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Americans on health care, whose cost increases exceed inflation, over-
all they are not affected any worse by inflation.40
In addition to their income advantage, seniors enjoy a wealth
advantage. A study published in 2000 indicated that 18% of them had
a net worth between $200,000 and $500,000; another 20% had a net
41
worth between $100,000 and $200,000. This substantial net worth in-
creased significantly during the large rise in housing equity value that
ended in 2006-07. On the other hand, some portion of this increase
was erased by the subsequent housing bust,42 and the debt burdens
carried by the elderly have increased.3 In any event, recent polling
evidence suggests that seniors are weathering the recession better
than other Americans."
G. Safety Net
The safety net protects seniors much more than any other group.
It protects them against the risk of indigence through entitlement pro-
grams, especially Social Security and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) for income maintenance, Medicare for health care and (since
2006) for prescription drugs, Medicaid for long-term care and other
services, and Food Stamps. Other programs such as Meals on Wheels
and social services, while not entitlements, are available to more se-
niors than ever before.4 5 Although future redesigns and cuts in these
40. Andrew G. Biggs, How Different Is Grandma's Spending?, AMERICAN, Oct.
17, 2009, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/october/how-different-is-
grandmas-spending.
41. ROBERT SCHAFER, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
HOUSING AMERICA'S SENIORS 7 (2000). Nearly 20% of seniors, however, had a net
worth of less than $25,000. Id. at 3.
42. See Desmond Lachman, A Return to Saving?, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. PUB.
POL'Y RES., July 2009, http://www.aei.org/article/100754 (discussing how the
Federal Reserve estimates that since early 2008, household wealth for the entire
U.S. population has declined by $13B; there is no breakdown for seniors). Home
prices are now rising again in many communities. Deborah Charles, White House
Says U.S. Housing Market Bottoming Out, REUTERS, Aug. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57K3BE20090821.
43. Craig Copeland, Debt of the Elderly and Near Elderly, 1992-2007, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES, Oct. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/notespdf/EBRINotes_10-Oct9.DebtEldly.pdf.
44. Karlyn Bowman, The Recession and Retirees, FORBES, Oct. 19, 2009, available
at http://www.aei.org/article/101183.
45. See MEALS ON WHEELS FOUND., Food for Thought, Fall 2009, at 2,
http://www.mowf.net/site/files/797/86465/311510/426965/FallNewsletter-
fylO.pdf; Meals-on-Wheels Greater San Diego, Inc., http://www.meals-on-
wheels.org/aboutus/index.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
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programs are likely, benefits for the elderly are often the last to be cut
both because no one expects them to work and because, as explained
in my discussion of the political economy of aging, their political po-
tency exceeds that of any other demographic group.
This demographic and survey data establish that the elderly in
America are well-off by whatever measures one employs. This is true
subjectively,4 objectively, in terms of absolute levels of well-being,
and in comparative terms, whether the comparison is to past genera-
tions of elderly, to the average non-elderly American today, or to the
elderly in almost all other wealthy democracies.
All things considered, today's seniors are probably the best-off
generation of seniors who ever lived. This distinction will continue
for the near future and, because any changes are likely to be phased in
over time, perhaps until their deaths. It informs my later analyses of
the political economy of aging in Part III and of intergenerational eq-
uity in Part VI.
II. The Twilight of the Golden Age?
Like all golden ages, this one too will come to an end, at least fis-
cally. This is true even though (indeed, as a fiscal matter, because) life
spans will, barring some ecological or other catastrophe, continue to
lengthen, better technologies of prevention and cure will continue to
develop, and seniors' health status will continue to improve.
My reasoning goes like this: In due course, the United States will
resume a trajectory of real economic growth. All Americans, includ-
ing pensioners, will share in the benefits of this growth, although not
equally. Nevertheless, the so-called dependency ratio47-the ratio of
seniors and dependent children who are not self-supporting to the
working-age population whose earnings and taxes must pay for most
of their support-will continue to rise. Although the dependency ra-
tio is actually much lower today (.66) than it was at its height in 1965
46. In 2009, 76% of Americans aged sixty-five to seventy-four reported that
they were "very happy" or "pretty happy." Only 19% of Americans in that age
range reported that they were "not too happy." SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
PROJECT, PEW RESEARCH CTR., GROWING OLD IN AMERICA: EXPECTATIONS VS.
REALITY 54 (2009).
47. On the dependency ratio, see LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF & SCOTT BURNS,
THE COMING GENERATIONAL STORM: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
AMERICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE 6-9 (2004).
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(.94) and will remain much lower for many decadesi its political and
fiscal significance depend less on the dependent group's size than on
its composition as between children and elderly. In 1965, the elderly
constituted less than 20% of the dependent cohort; today, they are
about 30%. 9 Because children are supported almost entirely by fami-
lies in private budgets while retirees are supported largely by taxpay-
ers through redistributive programs in fiercely contested public
budgets, provision for seniors is more of a political issue."'
Although the dependency ratio is not particularly high com-
pared with recent decades, it will soon rise due to the combination of
Baby Boomer retirements and a workers cohort diminished by the Ba-
by Bust that followed the post-war Boom. Thus, meaningful reform of
Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and other public pension sys-
temss2 cannot be delayed much longer, particularly because a long
phase-in period for any significant changes, especially in pensions, is
required for both fairness and political reasons. Indeed, a long phase-
in period, however necessary, ceases to be possible at some point.
3
Absent fundamental and immediate changes in Medicare's fiscal and
benefit structure, the Medicare Trust Fund will be exhausted in 2019,
two years earlier than the Trustees projected as recently as a year54
ago. And even these dire estimates do not take full account of the
48. LAURA B. SHRESTHA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AGE DEPENDENCY RATIOS
AND SOCIAL SECURITY SOLVENCY app. fig.1 (2006), http://aging.senate.gov/
crs/ss4.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Programs for seniors tend to be redistributive in at least two senses: favor-
ing retirees over working taxpayers and favoring low-income seniors over weal-
thier seniors.
51. I thank Jerry Mashaw for bringing this important point to my attention.
52. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Pension Costs for Local Governments May Triple by
2015, Analysis Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at A19.
53. As one observer put it, "[tihe transfer arrangement between cohorts and
age-groups in the United States apparently is and may well continue to be out of
phase with demographic and economic development, to an extent that may be im-
possible to correct." Peter Laslett, Is There a Generational Contract?, in JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 35 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds.,
1992).
54. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 8. On the Social Security side, the combined
OASDI Trust Fund will likely be exhausted in 2037, with the disability insurance
fund exhausted in 2020. Id. I am not suggesting, of course, that the Trust Fund
marks the limit of the government's fiscal commitment to pay Medicare's costs.
Officials know, and the public presumably assumes, that the government's general
revenues also stand behind the program. See, e.g., ERIC M. PATASHNIK, PUTTING
TRUST IN THE U.S. BUDGET: FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS AND THE POLITICS OF
CoMMmAENT (2000).
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immense deficits that the Congressional Budget Office now projects
for at least a decade in light of the reduced revenues induced by the
current recession, the unprecedented fiscal and debt commitments al-
ready approved by Congress,"5 and the further deficit increases likely
entailed by health insurance reform legislation.6
Precisely when (or to some optimists, whether) the day of reck-
oning will actually occur depends on many political, demographic,
technological, actuarial, economic, and other factors, some of which
are discussed below. It could be deferred somewhat under certain
conditions: higher fertility rates, higher rates of productivity growth,
more immigration by young workers, or later retirements. Looking to
these possibilities to rescue health and pension programs, however,
would be very risky.
A. Fertility
Fertility rates are unlikely to be high enough to avert this out-
come, 57 and in any event would take too long to increase the size of the
work force to "rescue" fiscally the Boomer generation that is about to
begin retiring. Indeed, during the two decades required for the new-
bors to enter the work force, they would serve only to increase the
dependency ratio.
B. Productivity Growth
Except for a burst of productivity growth during the late 1990s,
probably related to computerization, the rise since the 1960s has been
relatively modest, and any future growth-enhancing factors will be
limited by the steady aging of the population, which tends to be a
55. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND EcoNoMic OUTLOOK: AN
UPDATE 1 (2009), http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doclO521/2009BudgetUpdate-
Summary.pdf.
56. Despite President Obama's assurance that it will be deficit-neutral now
and in the future, I view this as inconceivable due to, among other things, its re-
liance on Medicare cuts and fraud-and-abuse savings that are very unlikely to be
realized.
57. A rise in U.S. fertility rates is possible. See The Best of All Possible Worlds?,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 8,2009, at 68 (reporting that contrary to customary demographic
patterns, a rising human development index, at some point, is correlated with, and
may cause, increases in fertility). Immigration is fueling small baby booms in the
United Kingdom, France, and some other European countries. Id.
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drag on productivity growth. 5 Yet only that level of growth seen in
the 1990s could possibly produce the kind of durable expansion in
wealth that could render Medicare and Social Security fiscally sus-
tainable in anything like their present forms.59 Such growth seems
highly unlikely.
C. Immigration
Although young immigrants (especially those who will leave be-
fore they draw program benefits) and later retirements would help to
lower the dependency ratio, they cannot solve the imminent fiscal cri-
sis in Medicare. Young, highly skilled immigrants could increase
productivity and fertility rates, while unskilled immigrants, particu-
larly the undocumented, contribute to the trust funds yet seldom re-
ceive program benefits. In order to make a substantial difference,
however, more immigrants would have to be admitted than Congress
is likely to allow.6
D. Delayed Retirement
American workers have indeed been delaying retirement,6' even
before the recent shrinkage in home equity and retirement savings
58. On the other hand, the increased hiring of workers aged fifty-five and
over may suggest that employers disagree. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text. A spurt in labor productivity during the second quarter of 2009 may or may
not be an augury of higher rates to come. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
PRODUCTIVITY AND COSTS, FOURTH QUARTER AND ANNUAL AVERAGES 2009,
REVISED tbl.B (2009), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/prod2.nr0.htm.
59. For a more optimistic view, see Lawrence H. Thompson, Sharing the Pain
of Social Security and Medicare Reform, RETIREMENT PROJECT (Urban Inst., Washing-
ton, D.C.), Aug. 2000, available at http://www.urban.org/publications/309607.
html. I am grateful to Jerry Mashaw for bringing this work to my attention.
60. Immigration to the United States is already at or above historic levels in
absolute terms and near historic levels as a percentage of the population. It will
not solve our fiscal problems. See, e.g., Steven A. Camarota, Immigration in an Aging
Society: Workers, Birth Rates, and Social Security (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Wash-
ington, D.C.), Apr. 2005, at 15; Dowell Myers, Aging Baby Boomers and the Effect of
Immigration: Rediscovering the Intergenerational Social Contract, GENERATIONS, Win-
ter 2008-2009, at 18, 22.
61. Murray Gendell, Older Workers: Increasing Their Labor Force Participation
and Hours of Work, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Jan. 2008, at 41, 41. From 1950 to 1955, the
average age of men exiting the labor force was 66.9 years; women exiting the
workforce during that period averaged 67.6 years. Retirement ages dropped stea-
dily throughout subsequent decades. From 2000 to 2005, the average age for men
exiting the labor force was 61.6 years; the comparable figure for women was 60.5
years of age. Id. at 42 tbl.1.
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and the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions.62
Recent evidence suggests that this trend is good economic policy, ac-
tually improving the employment prospects of younger workers.6
Whether the trend of delaying retirement will continue, however, re-
mains to be seen. After all, until recently the trend went in the oppo-
site direction, and much depends on the changing nature of jobs and
composition of the workforce.
Social policy experts have debated for decades the merits of var-
ious policy responses to the insecure financing of these programs for
the elderly. Fiscal projections and policy analyses are regularly
churned out by the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office, and
think tanks like Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute.
They attribute Medicare's looming insolvency to the physical aging6
of the population, technological advances that are often both costly
and beneficial, excessive testing and treatment, sluggish economic
growth, policy changes that promised higher benefits without secur-
ing the revenues to pay for them, unrealistic public expectations
created by dissembling politicians, and especially health care cost in-
flation."' The analyses identify promising policy fixes, but no quick or
easy solutions-particularly given the lack of political consensus on
whether and to what extent future pensions, which are to some degree
substitutes for publicly financed health care programs, should be the
responsibility of the state or of individuals. The struggle for problem
definitions and policy solutions will be shaped largely by the political
economy of aging.
62. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
63. See Jonathan Gruber et al., Social Security Programs and Retirement Around
the World: The Relationship to Youth Employment 52-58 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 14647,2009).
64. It is physical aging, not chronological aging per se, that generates these
costs. We could reduce the program costs associated with chronological aging by
raising the age at which people become eligible for benefits, but the costs asso-
ciated with physical aging-illness and disability-are far harder for society to
postpone.
65. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE
SPENDING (2007), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/Intro.shtml. In-
deed, then-CBO director Peter Orzag argued in 2007 that the effect on Medicare
and Medicaid of the aging of the population is swamped by health care inflation.
Id.
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III. Political Economy of Aging
No large demographic group in American life defends and ad-
vances its interests in the political sphere more effectively than the el-
derly. They constitute a formidable and ardently sought-after voting
bloc, given their comparatively high propensity to register and vote in
elections.i They are broadly distributed across all states and com-
munities, while also concentrated in some important swing states, es-
pecially Florida. Seniors are also well-organized through the AARP,
one of the country's most effective lobbies, and through other senior
67
organizations. Unlike many other groups that must forge a common
identity and sense of solidarity, the elderly share a truly natural com-
monality of experience--aging-which creates an automatic commu-
nity of interest in many areas such as health care and pension policy,
and this enables them to focus their political efforts as few groups can.
Their focus and allegiance are intensified and unified, moreover, by
the fact that they cannot leave the group-unlike, say, the poor.6
Finally, the elderly enjoy a unique relationship with the rest of
society, one characterized by immense sympathy, respect, and even
self-projection by younger people. Taxpayers view seniors, more than
other groups of social program beneficiaries, as "good apples" (a term
whose meaning in this context I discuss in Part IV). This view reflects
not only the special emotional factors just discussed but, presumably,
also the expectation that giving benefits to retirees will not create the
moral hazard and other perverse incentives that giving such benefits
to those of working age might produce.
66. For example, 68.1% of individuals registered to vote aged fifty-five to six-
ty-four voted in the 2008 presidential election; by contrast, less than half of poten-
tial voters aged eighteen to thirty-four voted. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING
AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008, tbl.4c, http://www.
census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2008.html.
67. Membership in AARP, which until 1999 was known as the American As-
sociation of Retired Persons, is not limited to seniors or retirees but extends to all
who are fifty or older. For an account of AARP's political effectiveness in connec-
tion with the amendment of the ADEA, see Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Har-
ris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 810-19 (1997). For an analysis of AARP's position on the
current proposals for Medicare reform, see Scott Harrington, The AARP Paradox,
AMERICAN, Oct. 2, 2009 (speculating about why AARP seems willing to counten-
ance Medicare cuts to achieve universal coverage).
68. I am indebted to David Super for this point. He notes that members of
some minority groups can leave by "passing" into other groups, and the young
will leave by aging into other groups.
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To be sure, the elderly face their own special disadvantages, and
their relationship with the young is complicated by Americans' obses-
sion with youthful vigor and fear of growing old (a fear that we prob-
ably share with members of all other modern societies). 9 But al-
though these fears surely contribute to some negative stereotypes of
the elderly (including much popular humor), the elderly enjoy an
enormous compensating advantage not possessed by other minority
groups: they are perceived as "us" as our future selves rather than as
alien or "other" or "they." It is for this reason that, as I observed ear-
lier, the elderly as a group are not vulnerable to the same kind of invi-
dious discrimination that severely disadvantages so-called "discrete
and insular minorities" and that requires heightened protection of
such minorities as a constitutional matter.70
These political advantages constitute a double-edged sword.
They assure that the common interests of the elderly as a group will
always be front-and-center in the calculations of all politicians and
that where those interests are unambiguous and unidirectional, they
will be well-protected in public policies. This senior power has been
exerted at all levels of government in recent decades and can only in-
crease as the population continues to age. At the same time, however,
this steadily growing political ascendancy of the elderly threatens to
entrench the policy status quo further, as seniors' percentage of the
voting population increases and as they resist any proposals for
change that might threaten their enviable position. 1 They may resist
reform even when certain changes, such as means-testing benefits or
increasing the eligibility age, are necessary to make these senior-
subsidizing programs affordable in the long run.7 Today, for exam-
69. One researcher finds that young adults with negative stereotypes of the
elderly are at greater risk of cardiovascular problems. Emma Anthes, Your Heart is
Only as Old as You Feel, YALE ALUMNI MAG., May/June 2009, at 31, 31. Perhaps the
researcher, Becca Levy, has come upon a novel way to improve health status!
70. For development of this idea, see Schuck, supra note 1, at 33, 37-38; Issa-
charoff & Harris, supra note 67, at 836-37 ("[Tlhe antidiscrimination model was
captured for the benefit of a group that is not socially reviled, not penurious, nei-
ther discrete nor insular, not cut off from the mainstream of society, and not
marked by the unmistakable badge of social opprobrium."). Supreme Court doc-
trine reflects this assessment. See generally Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (ruling that age is not a suspect classification).
71. But see Harrington, supra note 67 (speculating about reasons why AARP
might countenance Medicare cuts to achieve universal coverage).
72. See, e.g., Susan Page, Poll: Americans Divided on Health Care Overhaul, USA
TODAY, Aug. 10, 2009, at Al ("Seniors are by far the most resistant to the idea of
changing the current system ..."); Katharine Q. Seelye, GENERATION GAP: Age
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ple, a growing plurality of seniors seem to believe, rightly or wrongly,
that President Obama's health care reform proposals will hurt them.
7 3
Yet under health insurance reforms recently passed by Congress that
will combine guaranteed issue, community rating, and individual in-
surance mandates, it seems likely that younger, healthier, lower-
income workers will be subsidizing older, sicker, higher-income
workers through the resulting premium structure. 74
This political entrenchment and inertia are even more pro-
nounced today because both political parties, desperate for senior
votes, are competing to be perceived as the most stalwart and unequi-
vocal defenders of the current Medicare program. This is hardly new
for Democrats, but it is novel for Republicans who historically have
criticized Medicare as wasteful, overcentralized, and overregulated.
Now, however, the Republicans are proclaiming that Medicare pro-
tects "Grandma" against the euthanasia and harsh cost-cutting that
they think "Obamacare" will inevitably entail. Given the conver-
gence of these Democratic and Republican tides, it is hard to see who
will resist efforts by the elderly to use their power to corral ever more
resources for themselves and preserve the status quo. Ironically, this
is true even where those resources are desperately needed to protect
the needs of future cohorts of seniors-to say nothing of the needs of
other groups, especially children.
This point was put more baldly and provocatively by former
Colorado governor Richard Lamm: "[mjy aging body can prevent
your kids from going to college .... We as a society spend more money
turning 80 year olds into 90 year olds than we do 6 year olds into edu-
cated 16 year olds." 76 These are fighting words that raise a profound
set of issues. These issues, less belligerently put, are usually analyzed
Divide on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at A14 ("[A] Gallup
poll... indicated fewer than half of the Medicare-age people favored changing the
system....").
73. Lexington: The Politics of Death, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5,2009, at 41.
74. See Michael 0. Leavitt et al., Health 'Reform' Is Income Redistribution, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009, at A21.
75. For a discussion of this political strategy, see Ross Douthat, Telling Grand-
ma 'No', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2009, at A19. For a critique of House members who
claim that the Democratic proposals will hasten the death of the elderly, see Nor-
man Ornstein, House Leaders Have a Fiduciary Duty to Protect the Institution, ROLL
CALL, Oct. 7, 2009, and Scott Gottlieb & Elizabeth DuPre, The Living Truth About
"Death Panels", AEI HEALTH POLICY OUTLOOK Oct. 2009 (criticizing such mislead-
ing language but also criticizing proposals' specific provisions on end-of-life coun-
seling).
76. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 67, at 836 n.254.
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in the technocratic terms of cost-effectiveness (discussed in Parts IV
and V) and the normative terms of intergenerational equity (discussed
in Part VI).
IV. Targeting Social Program Resources"
One public value that has (or should have) a direct bearing on
social policy in general, and on social policy toward the elderly in par-
ticular, is what economists call target efficiency. This is the common-
sense goal of directing resources to the individuals for whom and the
purposes for which they will do the most good. In this view, policy-
makers should improve the targeting of social programs so that the
programs can accomplish more of their goals while using the same re-
sources to assist the same needy populations for which the programs
were (or should have been) primarily designed.
A. The Ubiquity of Poor Targeting
One cannot seriously disagree with the desirability of target effi-
ciency. Instead, the controversy arises over which outcomes consti-
tute the good and which programs contribute the most to it. To be
sure, the politicians and bureaucrats who design these programs may
reasonably differ on the answers to those two questions. But even so,
many social programs are not nearly as well-targeted as they could be;
indeed, a few are so poorly targeted as to call their social value into
serious question.8 President Obama's proposal to give $250 to all So-
cial Security recipients is a classic example of such poor targeting.
Some of the reasons for poor targeting are conceptual or analyti-
cal, but many of them are purely political. Simply put, groups that
receive fewer resources than they want from a program will lobby
(and perhaps even sue) for more, and they will be joined in this rent-
seeking by others who wish to sell them services.s Conservatives are
77. The discussion in this and the next section draws heavily on PETER H.
SCHUCK & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, TARGETING IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS: AVOIDING
BAD BETS, REMOVING BAD APPLES 46-74 (2006). The interested reader will find
more detail there, as well as support for statements made but not footnoted here.
78. For examples, see id. at 27-45.
79. Jackie Calmes, Obama Seeks $250 Check for Retirees and Veterans, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2009, at B7. The check would also go to veterans and the disabled. Id.
80. Also inevitable is the politicization of efforts to assign values to statistical
life (VSL) necessary to support the targeting analysis. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The
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likely to be skeptical of any effort to improve targeting that they fear
may be costly, and they may also fear that such reforms will only
serve to legitimate the welfare state and increase its funding. Liberals,
for their part, seldom actively champion target efficiency, fearing that
acknowledging the problem of poor targeting will play into conserva-
tives' hands and that better-targeted programs will deprive many
worthy people of benefits.8'
These political obstacles to better targeting can be overcome. For
example, state and congressional reforms in the 1990s to improve tar-
geting in welfare programs resulted in far more money being spent
per capita on what most Americans consider the "deserving poor"
than was spent before the reforms.8 2 Since then, moreover, politicians'
attacks on these newer, better-targeted welfare programs have been
much reduced.
B. A Taxonomy and Technology of Targeting
In a recent book, economist Richard Zeckhauser and I analyzed
the problem of poor targeting in social programs by distinguishing
three categories of people. We call them bad draws, bad bets, and bad
apple's. Only bad draws and bad bets are relevant to my analysis
here, which focuses on programs benefitting the elderly. And when I
speak of good or bad bets (or draws), the judgment is not absolute but
only relative to other people who might claim the same resources. In-
deed, they are arrayed along a continuum with no clear dividing line,
so that program officials will often have difficulty deciding whether or
not to give, say, a costly medical procedure to an elderly person in a
certain condition.
"Bad draws are people who were dealt a bad hand at birth or
later and who have suffered misfortune as a result," leaving them dis-
advantaged. 84 Although many social programs target bad draws,
some in fact benefit good draws, like corporate farmers and well-
heeled public pensioners." Bad bets "are people who are unlikely to
Devaluation of Life 18-24 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. working paper No. 09-14,
2009) (describing strong public opposition to two reductions in VSL by EPA).
81. See David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism
and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PENN. L. REv. 541, 593-601 (2008).
82. Id. at 586-93.
83. SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 77, at 7-27.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id. at 38.
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derive much benefit from a programmatic intervention on their behalf
relative to either the resources that they would consume or the bene-
fits that people who are better bets would derive from the same re-
sources." 86 A common example of a bad bet who would gain too little
benefit compared with what another beneficiary would gain is a per-
son in precarious health competing for a cadaver kidney with a far
healthier person. The current priority system for kidney transfers in
the United States, holding quality-of-match constant, allocates them
first to those who have been waiting the longest and who are often the
sickest. However, these are the people who will receive the least ben-
efit from them in terms of "quality-adjusted life years" (QALYs), a
conventional, though controversial, policy analytic measure of social
benefit in which one QALY means one year of full function, zero
QALYs means a year not alive, and a fractional QALY means an in-
between state such as a year involving some pain or disability.
87
The more common kind of bad bet, however, is an individual
who will derive too little benefit relative to the material resources he
or she consumes. An elderly person in poor condition is a low-value
candidate for an expensive heart valve transplant even though heart
valves, while costly, are readily available. A college student who is
likely to drop out is a bad bet for heavily subsidized higher education.
One who has already dropped out of high school is an even worse bet,
yet, remarkably, public colleges are increasingly placing it.8
Any particular application of the bad bet concept in the name of
target efficiency requires society to make highly controversial moral
judgments and to analyze social costs and benefits, which in turn ne-
cessitates empirical determinations that for familiar reasons may be
elusive and will surely be politicized, as in the case of organ alloca-
tion. Such decisions can be highly contestable-and properly so. One
common basis for contestation is the value of fairness. Properly un-
derstood, however, target efficiency is complementary to fairness, not
contradictory to it. Allocating scarce resources to bad bets rather than
to good ones is wasteful and surely unfair, even when the bad bets are
admirable people, as in the case of spending hundreds of thousands of
86. Id. at 7-8.
87. Id. at 50. The QALY measure is explained and its use defended. Id. at 50-
55.
88. See id. at 138 n.3 (citing Karen W. Arenson, Can't Complete High School? Go
Right to College, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 2006, at Al).
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dollars on an exemplary citizen who is near death.89 Those resources
could accomplish much more for other medically needy citizens,
promoting both fairness and cost-effectiveness goals.
In a world of limited resources, the importance of target efficien-
cy lends urgency to the inevitable need to prioritize among social wel-
fare expenditures, most obviously in programs subsidizing medical
care. The word "prioritizing" is often a euphemism for the dreaded
word "rationing." In conventional political discourse-most notably
in the current health care debate-the term rationing is used only to
cast a proposal into outer darkness; it is never used to describe and
justify an allocation technique that is necessary, albeit regrettable. If
using the prioritizing euphemism helps to render the reality and ne-
cessity of rationing more acceptable to the public while not obscuring
what is actually at stake in the policy, there may be no harm in it.
With apologies to La Rochefoucauld, one might say that such a eu-
phemism is the homage that politicians pay to unpleasant policy im-
peratives that compromise our abstract moral ideals.90 Viewed most
charitably, we use it to make our tragic choices more palatable.9' More
realistically, it serves to conceal sloppy thinking and mask political
cowardice. Target efficiency and better bets are the unacknowledged
victims of these poor choices.
Rationing of scarce resources, then, is an inescapable feature of
all rational choice-although it matters a great deal precisely which
constraints such choice is under and whether the rationing is done by
bureaucratic fiat, market decisions, or some hybrid process. More to
my present point, the necessity for rationing in the design of public
programs is increasingly obvious and undeniable for fiscal, demo-
graphic, technological, and other reasons.92 Both Medicare and ma-
naged care organizations routinely discourage expensive procedures
89. See Lawrence K. Altman, The Man on the Table Devised the Surgery, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2006, at Al. Famously, the eminent surgeon Dr. Michael DeBakey
received extensive heart repair, at a cost exceeding $1 million, when he was ninety-
seven. The hospital apparently did not charge for it. Id. DeBakey died eighteen
months later at the age of ninety-nine. Lawrence K. Altman, Michael DeBakey, 99,
Rebuilder of Hearts, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at Al.
90. "Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue." Duc de La Rochefou-
cauld, Reflections, or Sentences and Moral Maxims, Maxim 218, in BARTLETr'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 981 (10th ed. 1919).
91. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 21-28 (1978).
92. See id. at 140-41; Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care: A Utilita-
rian Philosopher's Argument for Placing a Dollar Value on Human Life, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 19,2009, at 38.
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that they think are not cost-effective,93 and doctors employ formal and
informal rationing methods, even as they may conceal this fact. (Bat-
tlefield medics, of course, have long used rules of thumb to make in-
escapable triage decisions about who can benefit most from the li-
mited interventions that the desperate circumstances permit.)
Despite these examples, many wise people bristle at this sort of
benefit-cost analysis or cost-effectiveness calculation,94 and there is a
large body of literature debating its merits in general, in particular
forms, and as applied to specific interventions9 Yet most people are
more likely to accept such policy analysis under two conditions. The
first-that the resource shortage relative to demand and need are both
clear and severe-is increasingly the case in health care. The bitter
debate over President Obama's health care proposals is only the most
important example; few commentators deny the urgent need to con-
trol costs. The second condition is that people who want to opt out of
this rationing and are able to bear the cost of private coverage can do
so. While acknowledging the equality and fairness concerns raised by
this condition, which gives an option to some people that is unavaila-
ble to poorer ones, there is no blinking the fact that this is a basic
background condition of all of our social policies: the law allows weal-
thier Americans to purchase private insurance and make other private
arrangements that avoid constraints to which those who must depend
on public programs are subject. Egalitarian considerations aside, the
vast majority of voters are much more likely to support measures de-
signed to improve the well-being of the poor minority if those voters
know that their own arrangements will not be limited or held hostage
to the lesser options that government provides to the poor.
93. For a discussion on Medicare, see Scott Gottlieb, How the U.S. Government
Rations Health Care, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at A23.
94. See, e.g., Irving Louis Horowitz, Letter to the Editor, Why We Must Ration
Health Care, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Aug. 2, 2009, at 6 (criticizing Singer's analysis and
identifying the purpose of treatment as "to extend the care and life of people with-
out regard to individual merits or even the collective costs to society").
95. Compare RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008) (arguing that by reforming cost-benefit
analysis, progressive groups can help enact strong environmental and public
health regulations), with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005) (expos-
ing the error of using cost-benefit analysis to decide whether human life and the
environment are worth protecting).
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In any event, few, if any, of our public or private health plans are
explicit about rationing, especially by age. As noted earlier, they do
exclude coverage for certain interventions and experimental proce-
dures, but they generally do not impose any age-based or health sta-
tus-based limits on costly treatments. Still, if insurers and policymak-
ers are counting on physicians to be vigilant, cost-effective stewards of
scarce health care resources, it is a vain hope: physicians are noto-
riously poor gatekeepers.9 Powerful incentives-including ethical ob-
ligations, loyalty to their patients, a desire to gain a reputation for sav-
ing lives, knowledge that insurance will protect most of their patients
from the costs, and possible personal financial interests--encourage
them to make treatment and testing decisions as if those resources
were essentially free and unlimited, rather than on cost-effectiveness
grounds.
The heated controversy over the recent recommendations of the
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force concerning age-based guidelines
for mammography testing97 perfectly illustrates this resistance to the
clinical use of cost-effectiveness criteria. Anticipating, and reacting to,
public and political charges that the guidelines will lead to rationing
of mammography by government programs and private insurers and
that this perception will in turn imperil the health care reform legisla-
tion pending in Congress, several revealing things happened. The
Obama administration immediately gave assurances that neither
mammography rationing nor other rationing of care would occur,98
major private insurers indicated that they would not change their
reimbursement rules,9 and many private physicians insisted that they
and their patients would not follow the new guidelines but would
continue to do mammographic tests desired by their patients even if
the Task Force-and even the physicians themselves-deemed them
cost-ineffective. 0
96. See Letter to the Editor, In H.M.O.'s, You Have to Know the Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1995, at A20.
97. Gina Kolata, Panel Urges Mammograms at 50, Not 40, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2009, at Al.
98. Kevin Sack & Gina Kolata, Screening Policy Won't Change, U.S. Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at Al.
99. Natasha Singer & Reed Abelson, Insurers Unlikely to Alter Policies in the
Debate over Mammograms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at B1.
100. Pam Belluck, Many Doctors to Stay the Course on Breast Exams for Now, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at Al.
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Even setting aside these social-psychological, political, and ethi-
cal obstacles to avoiding bad bets, there are daunting analytical diffi-
culties in doing so. First, the analyst needs detailed information about
the patient's medical condition to determine the potential benefits and
costs of a particular treatment for that specific patient. Second, the
analyst needs a broad database capable of revealing the frequency and
magnitude of the bad bets problem in light of past outcomes and as
applied to this category of patient, yet seldom are such fine-grained
data on outcomes readily available.
Given these informational limitations, the best way to screen for
bad bets at the individual level is to identify broad categories of po-
tential recipients who probably would receive only modest benefits
relative to other possible recipients and relative to the resources that
they would use. Using age (or many other characteristics) as a basis
for rationing may be politically dangerous (as in the case of mammo-
graphy) or perhaps even illegal--even when doing so would predict
relative cost-effectiveness. For example, federal civil rights law bars
the use of age as a screening tool in federally assisted programs, sub-
ject to some broad exceptions.01 The United Kingdom used to ration
kidney transplants using an age cutoff, but no longer does so.'0 2 In-
deed, the United Kingdom no longer uses age as an official considera-
tion for any procedures. The much-debated Oregon Medicaid priori-
tization system did rank health interventions on cost-effectiveness
grounds, essentially barring lower-ranked interventions.' 3 Some of
these rankings depended on the recipient's age, but seniors' opposi-
tion to this forced the George H. W. Bush administration to prohibit
such uses of age-yet another sign of the political potency of the el-
derly.
Whether age is actually a good predictor of certain medical out-
comes, moreover, may depend on which outcome measure one uses-
for example, QALY gains as opposed to short-term survival rates. Al-
ternatively, age may be a good marker of relative vulnerability to a
disease, with the elderly often more vulnerable (as in the case of most
cancers) and sometimes less vulnerable and thus less needful of
101. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 28.
102. BRITISH TRANSPLANTATION SOC'Y & THE RENAL ASS'N, UNITED KINGDOM
GUIDELINES FOR LIVING DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION 36 (2000).
103. OR. HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, OFFICE FOR OR. HEALTH POLICY &
RESEARCH, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 4 (2009).
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treatment than others (as in the case of swine flu).' °4 Age, of course, is
a cruder predictor of the potential benefits of a medical intervention
than one's specific medical condition would be, but it has the major
advantages of being both easily measurable and objectively even-
handed in the sense discussed earlier and below.
For health care, many people are bad bets simply because they
are old or sick and thus have fewer QALYs left than younger people,
including younger people with similar medical conditions. For this
reason, rationing care simply on the basis of age may seem callous
and invidiously discriminatory. But such rationing is prudent and
fair so long as it is designed and implemented through a transparent
democratic process that asks the right questions (including about the
positive social effects of the elderly, such as their loving care of grand-
children) and that seeks the best answers to those questions, with se-
niors fully involved in the public debate. Policymakers may reject
such rationing, of course, but we should be clear that, as Part VI will
argue, no overriding notion of equity condemns it.
C. Recognizing Elderly Interests in Targeting Decisions
In the case of the elderly, we can be confident that any legislative
or administrative effort to target resources on the basis of cost-
effectiveness and QALY measures will satisfy these criteria of fair
process, even where the targeting seems to favor younger over older
people. (I say "seems" in order to underscore the difficulty of know-
ing in advance precisely how a policy will affect different groups, es-
pecially those that are internally heterogeneous.)
Several factors amply justify this confidence. First, as noted ear-
lier, a policy that disadvantages the elderly is far less likely to be
mean-spirited or animated by hostility, to represent an us-versus-
them barrier, or to be otherwise invidious, than is a policy that disad-
vantages racial and other minorities whose characteristics or prefe-
rences are clearly distinct from those of the majority. After all, the el-
derly are not only our parents and grandparents; they are also us, as
we will (all too soon) become. To harm the elderly, then, is in a real
sense to risk harming ourselves at a future point in time that we all
104. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Anxious Crowds Meet Ad Hoc Swine Flu Police,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2009, at Al (stating that in light of shortage of flu vaccine, el-
derly are urged not to get it because they are at lower risk than children).
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earnestly hope to reach. In our more rational moments, at least, we
recognize this fact. This is not to deny, of course, that decisions that
implicate our identities across multiple time periods in the future
(here, younger voters projecting their own frailty and vulnerability
many years hence) are psychologically complex, epistemically uncer-
tain, and thus anything but straightforward' a5
Second, the optimal conditions for making hard collective re-
source allocation choices that affect different groups differently arise
precisely when voters know or suspect that they may themselves ex-
perience the full beneficial and adverse consequences of those choices.
This foreknowledge encourages an uncommon self-discipline, highly
salutary in a democracy like ours, that can encourage voters to make
relatively wise, disinterested, egalitarian, and public-spirited deci-
sions.
Third, as noted earlier, the elderly constitute a large, growing,
and highly effective voting bloc fully capable of protecting its group
interests, providing additional assurance that policies that steer away
from elderly bad bets are unlikely to be adopted for hasty, ill-
considered, or invidious reasons. If anything, the greater danger may
be just the opposite: the elderly are so politically powerful that no pol-
icy that they think will adversely affect this is politically viable, re-
gardless of how socially beneficial and fair the policy might seem to
others.' °
Indeed, social policy today disproportionately favors the elderly
over children. Social policy expert Julia Lynch notes that "U.S. social
programs are more skewed toward the aged than in almost any other
nation. The United States doles out nearly 40 times as much per se-
nior citizen as per child and working-age adult."1°7 A very recent re-
port indicates that this imbalance favoring the elderly at the expense
of children (and other groups) is actually growing; the share of federal
105. For example, we know little about the discount rates that younger people
apply and the heuristics that affect their reasoning when they value future costs
and benefits. The same is true of the discounting that seniors may do when assess-
ing the tax burdens that their children's generation may have to bear.
106. This possibility depends, among other things, on how cohesive the senior
electorate is. This may, in turn, depend on the precise shape of the demographic
bulge, particularly whether some current and future seniors would actually benefit
themselves if these social programs were reformed fiscally. If so, this might divide
that electorate and facilitate reform. I am indebted to Daniel Markovits for this
suggestion.
107. Jacob S. Hacker, False Positive, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 2004, http://www.
tnr.com/article/False-positive-O.
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outlays for children was just under 10% in 2008 and is projected to de-
cline to 8.3% in the next decade. ' 8 The political weight of the elderly
makes them the most formidable status-quo force in American life to-
day; this force will steadily grow in the future. In an environment
demanding profound and unpopular changes, this deepening policy
inertia is a recipe for disaster.
V. Hard Choices
The first point to be made about the hard choices that confront
us is that these choices can be more or less well-informed. Although
we do not know nearly all that we should want to know in order to
target programmatic resources efficiently, existing studies of cost-
effectiveness enable us to make better policy and allocation choices-
better bets-than we have previously made.
In our book on targeting, for example, we present a table (4.1)
that lists thirty discrete interventions-for infectious-disease; for can-
cer; for neuropsychiatric and neurological, cardiovascular, respiratory,
genitourinary, and musculoskeletal conditions; for congenital abnor-
malities; and for critical care. Based on published, peer-reviewed
cost-effectiveness studies, we list the cost per QALY for each interven-
tion. It turns out that the cost-per-QALY differences among the inter-
ventions in each category are dramatic. For any reasonable value-of-
life estimate-and the methodology for valuing life is now fairly well-
developed-some of the interventions are clearly bad bets. Absent
some other factor trumping cost-effectiveness, interventions that pro-
duce QALYs at relatively low cost should be funded before society
moves up the ladder to more costly-per-QALY interventions for that
condition. Indeed, if we are systemically rational and look across the
illness categories and not just within them, we should follow the same
targeting rule.
Three points deserve emphasis here. First, this approach is only
as good as the underlying studies and the QALY estimates that they
yield. This limitation, however, is equally true of any evidence-based
decision technique."0 As it happens, the cost-effectiveness differences
108. JULIA B. ISAACS ET AL., KIDS' SHARE: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN THROUGH 2008, at 31 (2009).
109. See SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 77, at 53 tbl.4-1.
110. Marc A. Rodwin, Commentary, The Politics of Evidence-Based Medicine, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 439,442-43 (2001). The Obama administration's approach
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across interventions and illness categories are sometimes large enough
to swamp any reasonable disagreements about precisely how to value
life for these purposes. Even where such differences might affect the
ultimate choice, moreover, the analysis can keep us focused on the
right question, which is the relative merits of the competing estimates.
Second, whatever the shortcomings of cost-effectiveness and
QALY analyses in targeting scarce social resources-including their
reliance on elusive information and emphasis on functionality-no
one has yet come up with a better alternative. Critics of such analyses
are generally unclear about their own methods, which customarily
employ criteria that are more arbitrary and subjective, prevent rigor-
ous analysis and criticism, or simply sweep the hard questions under
the rug."'
Third, and most relevant to my larger argument here, the cost-
effectiveness differences among competing medical approaches are
often highly sensitive to the patient's age. For example, tamoxifen
treatment for primary prevention in women aged thirty-five at very
high risk of breast cancer is $45,000 per QALY, compared with $89,000
for women aged fifty, and $140,000 for women aged sixty 12 The im-
portance of age reflects both the inherent nature of the QALY measure
(which, other things being equal, favors younger people), and the fact
that, generally speaking, the success rate for most medical treatments
declines with the patient's age. This means that the major gains that
cost-effectiveness analysis can yield are likely to require targeting de-
cisions that take the patient's age into account-not simply in the way
that many physicians now informally consider age in deciding which
interventions to recommend and undertake but in a more categorical
fashion.
How categorical should such age-based targeting decisions be?
A rule's optimal level of generality/specificity is always a complex,
multidimensional question. This is especially true where (1) the rule's
to health care reform emphasizes cost control through evidence-based medicine,
which is fraught with political risk. See Theodore Marmor et al., The Obama Admin-
istration's Options for Health Care Cost Control: Hope Versus Reality, 150 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 485,485-86 (2009).
111. For a critique of one such alternative, the so-called precautionary prin-
ciple, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCPLE (2005). Two other approaches-ethical and rights-based theories-tend
to operate at levels of generality that have little resolving power for difficult health
care allocation choices.
112. SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 77, at 53 tbl.4-1.
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applications may affect the quality of life and the risk of death; (2) any
rule is likely to be underinclusive, overinclusive, or both; and (3) the
rule's error costs may be high, may be heterogeneously distributed,
and may be expensive to reduce. In such cases, pressure to grant ex-
ceptions for those excluded by the categorical rule will be great.13 In
addition, we have seen that a strong ethos exists among physicians to
do all they possibly can for all patients in their care, an ethos fortified
by psychological, legal, insurance, and perhaps personal financial in-
centives. Finally, as the Oregon Medicaid experience shows, society,
not just the treating physician, finds it hard to deny treatments for A
while providing it to B simply because A is slightly older than B and
so falls just over the bad bet line drawn by the age-based rule. Fear of
slippery slopes is a common, sometimes justified objection to an age-
based categorical rule.
But society should not rule out categorical rules altogether-it
should not have a flat rule against flat rules-if, as I have argued, it
has an overriding duty -to target its scarce health care -resources on
those expected to benefit most from them, and if it wishes to avoid
consuming too many of those resources in relatively costly case-by-
case determinations of cost-effectiveness. Instead, it can try to palliate
the crudeness of such rules at their edges. One approach is to adopt a
flat age rule but allow those who can show that they are "type 1 er-
rors" (i.e., the age rule excludes them but they are actually good
bets 1) to prove this and thus qualify for exceptions. A program
might also allow those who are bad bets under the age rule access to
the treatment only if they pay a higher fee; the fee could be calibrated
to how far over the bad bet line they fall.
Significantly, this approach would reverse the logic of existing
age discrimination statutes, which bar age discrimination categorically
but then permit exceptions in which age is taken into account. In con-
trast, the proposed approach would permit flat rules that discriminate
by age in the allocation of publicly subsidized health resources, while
allowing individuals to show that they are cost-effective exceptions to
that rule's crude generalization."' I say "publicly subsidized" because
113. For a much fuller discussion of this problem, see id. at 99-128.
114. Type 2 errors--bad bets who nonetheless qualify for the treatment under
the age rule-will consider themselves lucky to get the treatment and will not seek
an exception.
115. Whether and how such exceptions congeal over time into a more general
class constituting a rule or precedent for the future is an interesting, but for present
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private insurers need no additional incentive to use cost-effective age
targeting rules, especially if, as I have just proposed, the age discrimi-
nation laws do not prohibit them.
Having laid out the methodology for using better targeting to
deal with hard choices, including rules based on age, I now turn to
some important targets of opportunity in the area of medical care.
(These focus, as the bank robber Willie Sutton did, on "where the
money is.") Two types of medical intervention-near the end of life
and futile care-present the lowest-hanging fruit, although even here
one must not underestimate the methodological, ethical, and political
difficulties that each of them presents, difficulties all too evident in the
current debates over health care reform.
1 6
A. Near the End of Life
Critics often characterize as wasteful health expenditures made
during the last month or year of life, reasoning that expenditures dur-
ing this period accomplish little and must be bad bets. But it is only
after the fact, of course, that we know a patient was in fact in the last
period of his or her life. More important and perhaps surprising,
Americans' increased longevity per se is not a major driver of Medi-
care costs. Estimated lifetime expenditures under Medicare for people
who die at the age of 101 and older are only 17% higher than for those
who die at age 80.117 Indeed, the marginal costs associated with an
additional year of life and annual payments both decrease as the age
of death increases. This is good news-on average, people who live
long lives are not bad bets for Medicare even in their advanced years.
But from a broader policy and fiscal perspective, this is quite mislead-
ing in that it fails to reflect the high and rapidly rising costs of long-
purposes peripheral, question-one that I have analyzed in detail elsewhere. See
generally Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and
the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 33 DUKE L.J. 163
(1984) (critiquing the problems which arise when equitable decisions in the area of
energy regulation are viewed as precedent).
116. See generally Reed Abelson, Months to Live: Weighing Medical Costs of End-
of-Life Care, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at Al; Roger S. Magnusson, The Traditional
Account of Ethics and Law at the End of Life--and Its Discontents, 6 J. BIOETHICAL
INQUIRY 308 (2009).
117. James Lubitz et al., Longevity and Medicare Expenditures, 332 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 999, 1001 (1995).
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term nursing home care for the elderly, most of which appear not on
Medicare's budget but on Medicaid and private budgets. 8
In terms of spending during the last year of life, the data also is
counterintuitive: the older the individual is, the less Medicare spent in
the last year of life, suggesting that it is cheaper for a person to wear
out than to die an untimely death."9 Alternatively, society may be
finding informal ways to spend much less money trying to save the
very elderly, conceivably because society, the individual seniors, or
their doctors or families think that greater investments would be bad
bets-even though the patients themselves pay only a small share of
the costs.
Leaving age aside, however, Medicare spends much more on
those in the last year of life than it does on its other beneficiaries. A
study using 1988 data found that although decedents in a given year
made up only about 5% of the Medicare population over sixty-five,
they made up 37% of the highest-cost 5%, and 47% of the highest-cost
1 %.1
2
0 (This is not an age phenomenon per se; as we just saw, annual
Medicare expenditures tend to decrease with age, although their costs
under Medicaid increase as they require long-term care covered by
that program.) Overall, those in their last year of life use about 28% of
the Medicare budget, roughly five to six times their proportional
share. The last six months of life, moreover, account for about one-
quarter of Medicare spending-a proportion that has not varied much
in recent decades.12
The trend in such spending, moreover, is worrisome. Between
1985 and 1999, the rate of admission to intensive care units for dece-
dents (i.e., those who die within six months after admission) jumped
from 20.9% to 31%.122 In 1999, decedents accounted for 50% of feeding
tube placements, 60% of intubations and tracheostomies, and 75% of
118. Brenda C. Spillman & James Lubitz, The Effect of Longevity on Spending for
Acute and Long-Term Care, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1409, 1414 (2000); see also
THOMSON, supra note 5. Congress is considering a new long-term care program as
part of the pending health care reform legislation. Anna Wilde Mathews, Plan
Creates New Program to Pay for Long-Term Care, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009, at A6.
119. Spillman & Lubitz, supra note 118, at 1414.
120. See James D. Lubitz & Gerald F. Riley, Trends in Medicare Payments in the
Last Year of Life, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1092,1095 (1993).
121. David Cutler & Patricia Keenan, Health Care, in UNDERSTANDING
AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 449,454 (Peter H. Schuck &
James Q. Wilson eds., 2008).
122. Amber E. Barnato et al., Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Med-
icare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 363, 368 (2004).
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cardiopulmonary resuscitations. '2 During that time, the share of those
decedents who underwent an "intensive procedure during the final
hospitalization" rose from 17.8% to 30.3%.124 There is no reason to
think that this upward trajectory has not continued in the last decade.
This would be fine if these individuals were receiving sufficient
benefits from these expenditures, but their lives are not being ex-
tended significantly (by definition), and it is unlikely that their quality
of life-on average, not in every case-is improved enough after these
high costs are incurred to justify them. Indeed, many people die in
hospitals when they would prefer to die at home, and most families
experiencing a recent death wish that less care had been 
providedn
This does not necessarily mean that they were bad bets-some may
have been good prospects for being restored to reasonably good
health and significantly longer life-but it suggests that many, per-
haps most, were indeed bad bets.
If we move to a much shorter period than one year before death,
the bets are dramatically worse. More than half of the spending on
decedents comes in the last sixty days of life, and more than 40%
comes in their last thirty days.'26 (This implies that one-eighth of the
overall Medicare budget is spent on individuals in the last thirty days
of life.) Because death followed within a month, it seems quite unlike-
ly that these individuals were good enough prospects for higher
quality or more extended life at the time the expenditure decisions
were made. Although treating physicians are keenly aware of the
poor prognoses, the physicians' complex incentives noted earlier-
and the prospect that a few patients will indeed have better out-
comes-push almost all of them toward making the bad bets.
With these facts in mind, consider the ethical case for limiting
expenditures that, viewed ex ante by a medical decision maker, are
likely to occur in the last few months of life of these bad bets. (The po-
litical case for doing so, of course, is quite another thing.127) First, such
123. Id.
124. Id. at 369 tbl.2.
125. See Ian Yarett, Beyond "Death Panels": The Right Way to Die, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 19,2009, available at http: / /www.newsweek.com/id/21 2693.
126. SCHUCK & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 77, at 61.
127. See, e.g., Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhom, A Primer on the Details of
Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at A8 ("Conservative critics say the
legislation could limit end-of-life care and even encourage euthanasia. Moreover,
some assert, it would require people to draw up plans saying how they want to
die.").
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a limitation is even-handed; each of us will have a last few months of
life.'2 Second, expenditures that are more than merely palliative
probably do little to promote either the quantity or the quality of life,
which is why many patients in this situation choose hospice care.
Third, physicians are likely able to predict more accurately the immi-
nent demise of patients who will in fact die within the next few
months when the patients' lethal symptoms are probably more ob-
vious than they are for patients who will in fact die more distantly.
Finally, the resources saved by such a limitation can be used to help
numerous other people (including bad draws) who are better bets
than those who seem likely to die shortly. We may reasonably as-
sume that any rational, disinterested person who understood these
facts would want to minimize the wasteful treatment decisions that
are now being made in the last thirty or sixty days of life even if she
recognized that some of those decisions would extend life somewhat
and, in a few cases, even significantly.' 29
B. Futile Care
Now, consider another large category of bad bets-those who
receive futile care, defined as nonpalliative interventions where the
patient's expected health benefit is zero or so minimal as to not justify
any significant cost. Clinicians, of course, often disagree about
whether a treatment is futile for a particular patient in a specific situa-
tion and about whether treatment should be withheld or withdrawn.
They disagree even more about quality-of-life predictions. Despite
these disagreements, however, the futile care problem is significant
enough to be worthy of more attention by policy analysts and provid-
ers. First, it wastes scarce program resources (by definition); the costs
for Medicare patients who are predicted to die in the ICU are vastly
disproportionate to their number"'o Second, futile care (like some
nonfutile but wasteful treatment, such as overuse of antibiotics and
128. As David Super notes, however, the young can hope that technological
and other changes that occur before they reach that stage will improve their fates.
129. Rawlsian-type rulemaking about social justice, conducted behind his "veil
of ignorance," would seem to endorse this view. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 118-22 (1971).
130. For data on this, see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text; see also Jane
E. Brody, One Piece of Health Reform: Avoiding 'Bad' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2009, at D7 (discussing how people vastly overestimate the chances of survival af-
ter resuscitation; on TV, more than 60% survive after CPR, while in real life only 5-
10% of those over seventy survive hospital CPR).
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unnecessary caesarean sections131) can actually make some patients
worse off.'32
Recent studies indicate that hospice services, which seek to
avoid futile and low-benefit care while improving the quality of the
life that remains, can provide significant cost savings for patients dy-
ing of cancer (but apparently not for noncancer patients). Indeed,
hospice care for cancer victims, greater use of advance directives, and
less aggressive treatments for terminal patients would together save
an estimated 6.1% of Medicare costs and 3.3% of total health care
spending."3
VI. Intergenerational Equity
From the technocratic and prescriptive, I now move to the ethi-
cal. Are the policy choices that I advocate just? What does one gener-
ation "owe" to other generations-in particular, those of its parents
and of its children? This question, simple in appearance, raises a host
of others that are anything but simple. What sorts of things might one
generation "owe" another, and what are the source and nature of this
obligation? Do intergenerational obligations go both ways? May the
obligations of one generation be conditional on another generation
behaving in certain ways? Are such obligations a matter of private
choice or of public law and social policy? These are only a few of the
ethical questions posed.'4
Some have claimed (rather implausibly, I think) that this inter-
generational equity is a new topic of social debate. "[Jiustice over
time," Peter Laslett and James Fishkin assert, "did not exist as a sub-
ject of analysis or discussion, or even as a concept, before... the 1960s
at the earliest."'- When it did emerge as an explicit concern, they
131. For a very recent example, see Joseph Pereira & Keith J. Winstein, Benefit
of Popular Spinal Surgery Is Questioned, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, at D1.
132. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 130 ("[Clommon life-prolonging interventions
can result in a host of debilitating or costly complications, like repeated infections,
mental deterioration, serious drug reactions and persistent pain and discomfort.
That doesn't even include the distress experienced by family members tending to
loved ones hooked up to myriad tubes and devices.").
133. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, The Economics of Dying-The Illu-
sion of Cost Savings at the End of Life, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 540,543 (1994).
134. There are also technical but consequential questions. For example, given
constant demographic flux and continuity, how do we measure generations and
identify the one to which we belong when they inevitably overlap?
135. Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin, Introduction: Processional Justice, in JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS, supra note 53, at 14. They attribute
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claim it emphasized the environmental and demographic claims that•136
future generations can assert against current policymakers, not on
the resource distribution claims that an earlier generation (the elderly)
can assert against those policymakers. Academic writing on intergen-
erational equity is the work of economists, moral philosophers, and
lawyers; the economists seem preoccupied with the issue of the dis-
count rate for valuing costs and benefits arising in the future, 137 while
the philosophers and lawyers focus on the idea of an intergenerational
contract.3 8
The contract metaphor is obfuscatory and question-begging in
this context. Clearly, no explicit contract between generations either
does or could exist. Any obligation of the parental (i.e., working) gen-
eration to the grandparental (i.e., retired) generation, then, must rest
on other grounds. It could be tactical on the part of the parents: they
care for grandparents in order to set an example that will encourage
the grandchildren to continue this norm once they themselves are
parents and their own parents retire. But a self-interested tactic is not
an obligation; it is quite the opposite. Alternatively, the obligation
could be moral, in which case it must rest upon terms other than mere
self-interest. What might these terms be? The most obvious sources
of moral claims are religious precept, justified reliance on expectations
and reciprocity, and simple gratitude.
A. Religion
Despite immense theological and other differences among the
world's religions, the command to "honor thy father and thy mother"
is perhaps universal.13 ' Three aspects of this near-universal precept,
much, though not all, of this lack of systematic reflection on obligations to posteri-
ty to the dominance of Christian revelation. Id. at 15-18. Henry Sidgwick men-
tioned the subject but did not elaborate. Id. at 19.
136. Id. at 20.
137. See, e.g., Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Discounting, 74 U. ClI. L.
REv. 1, 2 (2007) ("The discounting effect is so powerful that it can drive the entire
analysis of the problem."). But see Lawrence Summers & Richard Zeckhauser, Po-
licymaking for Posterity, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 115 (2008) (analyzing broader
issues).
138. In Peter Laslett's version, it is a "tricontract." Laslett, supra note 53, at 25.
139. For a thought-provoking analysis of the different versions and interpreta-
tions of this commandment, with particular reference to responsibility for elders'
long-term care, see Richard L. Kaplan, Honoring Our Parents: Applying the Biblical
Imperative in the Context of Long-Term Care, 21 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 493 (2007).
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however, are of interest here. First, it speaks of "honor," not redistri-
bution. Honoring parents may entail treating them with special re-
spect, protecting them from destitution, indignity, and so forth, but
beyond that it seems merely hortatory. Second, this duty of filial re-
spect coexists with another, even more compelling, obligation to nur-
ture and protect one's children. Third, filial respect is a personal obli-
gation, not a social one. Indeed, "socializing" this duty might, from a
religious perspective, risk contradicting its core value.
B. Expectations and Reciprocity
For one to act in a way that engenders expectations by another
may create a moral (and in some cases, a legal) obligation to meet
those expectations. But this reliance is justified only if the expecta-
tions are reasonable. To avoid the problem of circularity, we must de-
cide which expectations are in fact reasonable. Which reasonable ex-
pectations for public support, then, might a senior have? Peter
Laslett, for whom the intergenerational relationship is best viewed as
based on trust, not contract, analyzes seniors' justified expectations in
the welfare state context:
If we apply the trust notion to social goods originating in a paren-
tal generation.., being transferred to a grandparental generation,
the trustee is the State.... As time passes, individuals composing
the cohorts that progress through the productive age-group make
their contributions (that is, ordinarily pay their taxes) in the confi-
dent expectation-their just expectations under the trust-that
those who come after will behave similarly. In due course those
successors will expect their own successors to do the same. It is
not a question in either instance of one party repaying another for
benefits received earlier, which is why the transfer arrangement is
more trustlike than contractlike. Nor is it a question of beneficia-
ries receiving a specified payment, never reducible, always in-
creasable, at a particular time. This is because of the discretionary
character of the trust, and because the trustees are obliged to pro-
vide for future demands due to anticipated demographic and
econom c developments by accumulating a balancing fund as ne-
cessary.
In short, seniors' expectations and reliance, to be reasonable, must be
tailored to society's other needs and its evolving constraints and reali-
ties. They cannot reasonably expect that even their legal entitlements
to social provision will remain unchanged. For much the same rea-
140. Laslett, supra note 53, at 33.
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son, seniors cannot expect an important, cognate social value-
reciprocity-to carry the same welfare provision into the indefinite
future. At most, reliance and reciprocity demand that significant re-
ductions in that provision be foretold and phased in over time.
C. Gratitude
Perhaps the most powerful, morally based motive for this wel-
fare provision is gratitude for the nurture and resources that current
seniors provided to current workers when the latter were children.
This sense of filial responsibility runs very deep, reflecting a mix of
psychological, economic, and cultural factors.1' Again, however, the
nature and precise scope of this moral duty, beyond that of basic pro-
tection and respect, are open questions. The duty seems too demand-
ing-not to say socially dangerous-if defined to preclude today's
voters from imposing any resource constraint that today's seniors did
not impose on their parents (or their children) when today's seniors
were worker-voters. My point is that although defining the duty this
way is morally arguable, it is not morally compelling. The same is
true of the claim that today's seniors created the very economic
growth that underwrites today's Medicare and other social programs;
it is morally relevant but not compelling.
Also relevant is the fact that each generation of American work-
ers has been wealthier than the one before and that this pattern is like-
ly to continue in the future. According to at least one analysis pub-
lished in 2000, current workers will be wealthier than their parents
even if they are taxed sufficiently to bring the Medicare and Social Se-
curity trust funds into long-term balance.4 This possibility, however,
does not resolve the moral dilemma; it only deepens it.
In thinking about these ethical questions, certain factual aspects
of the current situation that were noted earlier stand out. Seniors to-
day are living in the golden age of aging, receiving far greater levels of
141. The costs of parenting have become very high. See Rachel Emma Silver-
man, Quarter-Million Dollar Baby: The High Costs of Raising Children, WALL ST. I.,
Aug. 6, 2009, at D6. For an argument that each generation owes the next one the
same per capita wealth that it inherited, see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 201-21 (1980) (discussing trusteeship).
142. For a recent analysis of the economic and social dimensions of family and
nonfamily households, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL
ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 10 (2008).
143. Thompson, supra note 59, at 4.
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social protection and resources than they provided to their own par-
ents. In this sense, they are the beneficiaries of far more generosity
than can be explained by the norms of gratitude, reliance, and reci-
procity that underlie any obligation owed them by their working
children. In addition, the rising dependency ratio imposes a burden
of support on current and future workers far greater than that which
the retiree generation bore toward their own parents. Most important,
workers' obligations to their children exceed (by a large margin, I be-
lieve) any obligations to their retiree parents, and the conflict between
these two obligations appears to be zero-sum T4 even though we may
pretend otherwise.
My claim that current workers owe more to their children (and
grandchildren) than to their parents rests on several factual premises.
As just noted, their parents have already received far more resources
than they (1) actually contributed to the retirement and Medicare sys-
tems that now support them, and (2) could reasonably have expected
when they were young workers. Raising children today is much cos-
tlier than it was when the retirees were parents and indeed than ever
before. '46 Coupled with longer life spans and periods of retirement,
this means that the worker generation must simultaneously support
their parents and their children-a double burden unprecedented in
its magnitude.
In this sense, today's retirees have received a large windfall rela-
tive to their own parents and their children. In another sense, howev-
er, it is the retirees' children who may have received a windfall, as the
intergenerational transfers go in both directions. Arguably, today's
retirees paid out more to support their children (current workers) than
the support they gain from their children's taxes for Medicare and So-
cial Security. 47 This net transfer calculation, of course, is a complex
one, sensitive to its assumptions.
144. I say "appears to be" in order to recognize the theoretical possibility that
more resources for children would so increase their productivity as future workers
that this marginal increase in economic growth could support even larger alloca-
tions to retirees without reducing the workers' wealth.
145. For an extended discussion of these issues, see THOMSON, supra note 5.
146. See Silverman, supra note 141.
147. Thompson, supra note 59, at 4 ("These estimates suggest that the present
value of the initial transfer from the parents to the children in a typical middle-
income household is likely to be comfortably above the present value of the trans-
fers-in the form of future payroll taxes-from the children to the parents, even if
payroll tax rates are increased to close the Social Security and Medicare financing
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Perhaps most relevant to my claim from a moral point of view,
retirees had alternatives--opportunities for self-help and self-
support-that their grandchildren manifestly lack. Retirees (except-
ing those who were chronically unemployed or destitute during their
working years through no fault of their own) could and should have
used those years to save for their old age-as the vast majority of
them did-by sacrificing some of their then-current wants. The fact
that the welfare state thereafter augmented those savings to a largely
unanticipated degree is simply icing on their cake. Their grandchil-
dren will probably not have similar good fortune unless they manage
to earn and save it themselves.
I hasten to add that I am under no illusion that less public
spending on the elderly would necessarily mean more public spend-
ing directly on children rather than on, say, infrastructure, housing,
defense, or tax reduction, which may benefit them (along with other
citizens) but only indirectly. There is no assurance that Richard
Lamm's wish to allocate to the education of youngsters resources that
are now used turning eighty-year-olds into ninety-year-olds'4 will be
gratified. Nor do I assume that any additional public spending on
children would necessarily be cost-effective or that the government is
the best allocator of resources for children. Indeed, the large increase
in public spending on public elementary and secondary education
since the 1970s, for example, appears to have had little positive effect
on student achievement, graduation rates, or other measures of educa-
tional progress in our urban areas.", More generally, the correlation
between spending per child and outcomes is weak; compared with
other wealthy countries, the United States has one of the highest levels
of such spending and among the worst outcomes.' ° Perhaps this lack
of cost-effectiveness is because U.S. spending on older children is
three times its spending on those of preschool age.151
The efficacy of better targeting of existing public resources, not
to mention additional ones, ultimately depends not on technocratic
gaps. The transfer from the higher-income parents to their children seems to more
closely approximate the transfer back in the form of future payroll taxes.").
148. See supra text accompanying note 76.
149. See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES,
COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-AcHIEVEMENT PUZZLE
IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 52-58 (2009).
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rationality (although careful policy analysis is essential to progress),
but on wise and courageous politicians and policymakers (hopefully
guided by such analysis). Recognizing these uncertainties, it never-
theless seems likely that only a retargeting of some portion of those
resources from the wants of the elderly to the needs of children can
create the fiscal space within which those needs might be better met.152
VII. Some Approaches to Policy Reform
My analysis has emphasized six broad, policy-relevant points.
First, today's seniors in fact enjoy living conditions that in some re-
spects exceed those of the average nonelderly American and that are
also far better than they could reasonably have expected when they
were young workers. Second, fiscal and demographic realities spell
the imminent end of this golden age of aging. Third, seniors are more
potent politically than any other single demographic group. Fourth,
bad bets abound in our health care system.1, 3 Fifth, no compelling
equitable principle can justify continuing these singular advantages at
the expense of the younger generations, which have more pressing
claims to social program resources now and which will likely find
fewer of these resources available when they themselves become el-
derly. Sixth, the elderly account for a large fraction of these bad bets
and of the costs that they generate, although no one knows the actual
percentage. Although some elderly are bad bets because they are bad
apples-for example, those who are frequently readmitted to hospit-
als due to substance abuse or other self-destructive behaviors 11-the
vast majority of elderly bad bets are bad bets not through any fault of
their own but simply because their age and physical condition make
152. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER
SOCIETY (1999) (describing one proposal in this spirit).
153. The fact that bad bets abound does not mean, of course, that our vast
health care expenditures do not generate immense benefits or that these benefits in
aggregate do not outweigh their aggregate costs. See DAVID CUTLER, YOUR MONEY
OR YOUR LIFE (2004). It just means that many specific expenditures were bad bets.
154. Serial substance abusers account for a remarkably high share of total hos-
pital costs, though most of them presumably are not elderly. See generally Christo-
pher J. Zook & Francis D. Moore, High-Cost Users of Medical Care, 302 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 996 (1980). Malcolm Gladwell describes fifteen chronically homeless ine-
briates and drug abusers who were treated in hospital emergency rooms a total of
417 times over eighteen months, running up medical bills averaging $100,000 dur-
ing this period. Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13,
2006, at 96, 96-107.
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many relatively expensive medical interventions not cost-effective for
them.
If public programs must target health care spending to minimize
bad bets, and if much of that targeting will necessarily aim at elderly
bad bets, then the multi-billion-dollar question is this: which general
policies (as distinct from patient-specific treatment decisions) can best
promote cost-effectiveness with the least offense to our society's moral
precepts? I shall briefly discuss five of them here.
A. Inform Patient Choice at the Time of Illness
Some patients, particularly elderly ones, may prefer to forego
expensive treatment even if it has some low probability of benefitting
them under certain conditions. We report on a recent example, sur-
gery for lung volume reduction, in which many doctors and Medicare
patients declined this procedure once they understood its high costs
and low benefits. Currently only 1.6% of Medicare spending goes-to
hospice care.55 This rate might be much higher, however, if doctors
told their late-stage cancer patients the following:
Despite our treatments, your cancer has continued to progress.
Though we could try treatment with an alternative regimen, I
think the likelihood of a significant response is low. Further, there
is a significant risk of making you ill or even hastening your death
from complications of this aggressive drug combination. I am
concerned about the quality of life in your remaining time. As an
alternative, we could stop your treatments now, providing hos-
pice care when needed. You would continue under my care to the
end, and your pain would be controlled.
Where the patient is demented, informing family members that ad-
vanced dementia not only afflicts the mind but is a progressive, phys-
ical, terminal disease like advanced cancer, may cause family mem-
bers to opt for less aggressive, costly treatment. '
155. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, A Data Book: Healthcare Spending
and the Medicare Program 188 chart 12-10 (2008), http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/Jun08DataBookEntire-report.pdf.
156. Tara Parker-Pope, Treating Dementia, but Overlooking Its Physical Toll, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 19, 2009, at D5. Studies indicate that increasing family members'
knowledge affected treatment preferences, and that 71% of nursing home residents
with advanced dementia died within six months of admission, yet only 11% were
referred to hospice care. Id.
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B. Encourage Pre-Illness Advance Directives
Asking patients to decide about bad bets when they are already
seriously ill, however, will often be too late. In contrast, living wills,
durable powers of attorney, and other forms of advance directives'
7
encourage people to make informed choices earlier, at a time when
they are more likely to make rational decisions and commit to abide
by those decisions later on. (As with all precommitments, one can al-
ways argue that the person who made it earlier was a "different per-
son" than the one who now faces death and that judgments about ra-
tionality should be "person"-specific in this sense.5 ) Although a
competent patient is always free to reverse the directive's precom-
mitments, which are usually broad, the fact that she has already
thought hard about the trade-offs and knows that they were made at a
time when her mind was free of the pressures and stresses of serious
illness should make her more likely to adhere to them.
Although advance directives may not help much with treat-
ments that generate some benefits on average but that are still not
cost-effective, they can help to curtail bad bets and especially those
likely to make the patient worse off in QALY terms. Relatively few
Americans execute any kind of advance directive, and many of these
directives are too vague to be truly useful.'59 Much more could be
done to encourage such directives. Medicare and Medicaid could
present a broad selection of optional directive forms as part of their
initial enrollment processes, and private health plans could do so on a
regular basis. Drawing on some states' rules on cadaveric organ do-
nations, the plans could present the most common form of advance
directive as a default choice, with enrollees who prefer some other op-
tion having to act affirmatively to exercise it. 65 Employers, unions,
157. The legal term for such instruments is now "health care power of attor-
ney." UNIF. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT (1993).
158. Many citizens, infuriated by a provision in a House health care reform bill
that would pay doctors to counsel Medicare patients seeking advice on end-of-life
issues such as living wills consider it a disguise for euthanasia. See, e.g., Naftali
Bendavid, Emanuel's Brother Becomes a Target, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A4.
This suspicion may in turn reflect this "different persons at different times" criti-
que.
159. Brody, supra note 130, at D7. For an example of a much more specific di-
rective, see Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New
Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3288 (1989).
160. On this general decision strategy, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008).
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and public health groups could hold focus sessions on the subject.
More radically, penalty defaults could be adopted to spur use of such
directives, although imposing too many penalties would surely
arouse a political reaction. Unfortunately, the recent political furor
over demagogically denominated "death panels" in recent debates on
health care reform may impede rational policymaking on advance di-
161
rectives.
C. Guide Physician Decisions on Bad Bets
Medicare policymakers should set general default rules about
who should receive which subsidized treatments based on large-
population statistics. These rules will be highly controversial, of
course, as they must rely on difficult statistical predictions about va-
riables that have sometimes been used to discriminate invidiously, not
rationally. Although physicians may reject these defaults when their
superior patient-specific information indicates that their patient is a
good bet for the treatment, opposition to rationing on the basis of
these variables will persist.
With better cost-effectiveness information and greater accep-
tance of ethical justifications for prioritizing in response to it, physi-
cians might be more inclined to initiate conversations of the kind that
I just proposed. A more radical option, which may become more de-
sirable as the research data improves, would be to expand the physi-
cian's duty to obtain informed consent to include disclosing such cost-
effectiveness information in bad bet situations. The courts should
then support physicians against malpractice claims or a family's de-
mand for additional treatment that the physician denied because she
deemed it a bad bet based on such data.
Numerous studies document that the same treatments are used
with highly varying frequencies in different locales, and that when
particular medical specialties prevail in a particular community, the
specialists provide more-and more intensive-treatments than in
other communities. This same pattern has been observed in hospitali-
161. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False 'Death Panel' Rumor Has
Some Familiar Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at Al.
162. Judicial opposition to the federal sentencing guidelines a quarter-century
after their adoption, while involving different variables and context, exemplifies
the tension between general criteria and on-the-ground, case-specific decision
making. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the sentencing
guidelines are advisory, not mandatory).
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zation rates, lengths of stay, and other dimensions of health care. This
suggests that specialists sometimes disserve their patients, delivering
procedures that are not worthwhile to the patient (but are perhaps
profitable to the physician). By educating physicians about bad bets
and by linking insurance and provider reimbursement rates to cost-
effective treatment decisions, incentives may become better aligned
with efficiency.
D. Research on Cost-Effectiveness
Policymakers should subject most common medical interven-
tions to much more extensive cost-effectiveness analysis in the service
of evidence-based care-a goal now almost universally endorsed, too
rarely implemented, and often jettisoned when the evidence is pub-
lished and threatens existing expectations and practicesi9 All of the
health reform plans pending in Congress would subsidize such re-
search at a much higher level.'M As this evidence accumulates over
time, much innovation is likely as the kind of "value-based competi-
tion" analyzed by Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg kicks in.
Public and private insurance plans might state in advance that they
will not pay for specified high-cost procedures of low or uncertain
value, just as they often do for procedures regarded as still experimen-
tal. Assuming, as almost all health economists do, that the costs of
employer-provided insurance come out of workers' wages, such a pol-
icy would benefit all members of the public who ultimately pay the
bill with their taxes, premiums, or wage reductions. In turn, employ-
ers, unions, and consumers choosing among competing health plans
could take into account different insurers' cost-effectiveness rules in
coverage decisions, especially if public disclosure of such rules is
mandated.
163. For a current example, see the earlier discussion of mammography test-
ing. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
164. Whether this research should be supervised or regulated by a federal
agency, as some have proposed, is an entirely separate question. For deep skeptic-
ism about such an agency, see Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Controlling
the Costs of Medical Care: A Dose of Deregulation (Univ. II. Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. LE08-023, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract.id=1158547.
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E. Other Policy Changes
Certain other public policies could effectively limit bad bets in
health care. As just noted, new reimbursement arrangements based
on cost-effectiveness could dramatically change medical practice to
encourage better bets. Medicare's Prospective Payment System, for
example, caused a sharp decrease in the number of in-hospital deaths
and a substantial rise in home care, office visits, and the use of outpa-
tient equipment, apparently without stirring much patient protest,
ethical controversy, or political backlash'
Another advance would be to deny reimbursement for diagnos-
tic tests in situations where they can lead to expensive treatments but
are likely to have little expected value based on age-based generaliza-
tions (although inevitably entailing occasional false positives) or on
other generally valid predictive criteria. If, say, one percent of pa-
tients will substantially benefit from a test, they should be reimbursed
for it-but only if they can be individually identified ex ante with high
enough probability. This more cautious approach to testing is bols-
tered by recent research findings on the unfortunate propensity of
prostate-specific antigen (PSA) screening to generate bad bet treat-
ments for slow-growing prostate cancer where "watchful waiting"
would be more individually and socially prudent.16
VIII. Conclusion
In this golden age of aging, better bets can play a valuable role in
improving social policy affecting the elderly, even as we recognize the
values and common psychologies that encourage us to make bad bets.
At some point, society must-in the name of compassion, justice, and
fairness for others, including future seniors-say something like this:
The state must treat the elderly ill and other bad draws fairly be-
fore it classifies some of them as bad bets. But if the costs of bad
bets are high enough, and if procedures sufficient to minimize er-
rors and protect due process are in place, then we will make the
hard decisions needed to avoid bad bets. We venerate our senior
citizens and want to comfort them in their twilight years. At the
165. See Robert Steinbrook & Ronald J. Ostrow, Medicare Study Finds Reforms'
Impact Mixed, Improved In-Hospital Mortality Rates Offset by Hike in Release and
Deaths of Unstable Patients, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1989, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/1989-04-30/news/mn-3136 1elderly-patients-quality-of-hospital-
care-death-rates.
166. Tara Parker-Pope, Screen or Not? What Those Prostate Studies Mean, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24,2009, at D5.
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same time, society must make hard choices; to fail to choose is to
choose, but irrationally. Our seniors have had their chance to lead
full, dignified lives and provide for their old age and infirmity
while enjoying vast public subsidies during a golden age far
beyond their reasonable expectations. Our top priority must be to
assure that their politically weaker children, grandchildren, and
great-grandchildren have that same chance.
I believe that we are now at that point.
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